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WEIGHING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
STATE IMMIGRATION VERIFICATION LAWS IN
THE WAKE OF ARIZONA V. UNITED STATES
PATRICK J. CHARLES
In the wake of Arizona v. United States, it is settled that state immigra-
tion verification laws like Section 2(B)l are facially constitutional. 2 At the
same time, the Supreme Court did not foreclose that Section 2(B) could be
preempted in terms of its application, nor did the Court shield the law from
subsequent civil rights litigation. 3 Thus, the question moving forward is
"under what circumstances, if any, can Section 2(B) be held unconstitu-
tional?" The question is important not only for unlawful immigration im-
pacted states like Arizona, but to a number of states that have enacted simi-
lar laws.4  In each case, the law requires state officials to verify the
immigration status of persons during lawful police stops or when arrested.
The purpose of these laws is simple and straight forward-to assist the fed-
eral government in the enforcement of federal immigration law through a
theory dubbed "attrition through enforcement." 5
From the very outset, opponents proclaimed these laws unconstitutional
on the grounds that they will lead to a myriad of civil rights violations and
impede on United States foreign affairs. 6 Opponents used law review arti-
I ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (Supp. 2010) (requires every "law enforcement official or
agency" to make a "reasonable attempt" at verifying an alien's immigration status where a "reasonable
suspicion" arises that the alien is unlawfully present).
2 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
3 Id. at 2510 ("This opinion does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to
the law as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect.").
4 See MO. REV. STAT. § 577.680 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-1003(B) (2011); IND. CODE. §
I 1-10-1-2(a)(4) (2012); Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011. H.B. 87, Article 5(b)
(Ga. 2011); An Act Relating to Illegal Immigration, H.B. 56, §12(a) (Ala. 2011).
5 See Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal Immigra-
tion, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 153 (2008).
6 For some different scholarly approaches arguing that these verification laws are unconstitutional
exercises of state power, see Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why
Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FL. STATE UNIV. L. REV.
965 (2004); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Fed-
eral Immigration Power, 74 UNIV. CINN. L. REv. 1373 (2006); Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related
State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U.
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cles, 7 news outlets, 8 and the Interet9 to convince the American public and
the courts that the laws facially endorse unconstitutional racial profiling.
And to their disappointment, '0 not one Supreme Court Justice found that
Section 2(B) was facially unconstitutional in this regard.' '
The survival of Section 2(B) to a facial challenge comes as no surprise to
those familiar with the ins and outs of constitutional precedent, federal im-
migration law, and preemption doctrine.12 In past decisions, the Supreme
Court has stated an officer's inquiry into immigration status is not a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. 13 Furthermore, there is precedent stipulat-
ing that race may be considered as a factor in raising a reasonable suspicion
CHI. LEGAL F. 27 (2007). See also generally Michael A. Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign Af-fairs, State Rights, and Alienage Classifications, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 217 (1994). For a rebuttal to these
approaches, see Patrick J. Charles, Recentering Foreign Affairs Preemption in Arizona v. United States:
Federal Plenary Power, the Spheres of Government, and the Constitutionality of S.B. 1070, 60 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 133 (2012) [hereinafter Recentering Foreign Affairs Preemption]; David Rubenstein, Immi-
gration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 81, 145-51 (2013).
7 See Lucas Guttentag, Discrimination, Preemption, and Arizona's Immigration Law: A Broader
View, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2012); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: State and Local Ef-forts to Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609 (2012); Keith Cunningham-Parameter, Forced Fed-
eralism: States as Laboratories of Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673 (2011); Lisa Sandoval,
Race and Immigration Law: A Troubling Marriage, 7 AM. U. MODERN AM. 42 (2011); David A. Sel-
den, Julie A. Pace, Heidi Nunn-Gilman, Placing S.B. 1070 and Racial Profiling Into Context, and What
S.B. 1070 Reveals About the Legislative Process in Arizona, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 523 (2011); Jennifer M.
Chacon, Border Exceptionalism in the Era of Moving Borders, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129 (2010); Ga-
briel J. Chin, Carissa Byme Hessick, Toni Massaro, and Marc L. Miller, A Legal Labyrinth: Issues
Raised By Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47 (2010).
8 See, e.g., Christina Boomer, State Law Professor Claims SB 1070 'Expressly Authorizes Racial
Profiling', ABCI5.cOM (July 26, 2010), www.abcl5.com/dpp/news/state/state-law-professor-claims-
sb 1 070-'expressly-authorizes-racial-profiling'.
9 See Kevin Johnson, Response to Arizona v. United States symposium contributors,
SCOTUSBLOG (July 19, 2011, 10:53 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/07/response-to-arizona-v-
united-states-symposium-contributors / (stating state enforcement will increase racial profiling, which
would impose a discriminatory burden not contemplated by Congress); Marjorie Cohn, Arizona Legal-
izes Racial Profiling, JURIST (Apr. 27, 2010), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2010/04/arizona-
legalizes-racial-profiling.php.
10 See Lucas Guttentag, Strong on Theory While Profiling Ignored, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2012,
7:03 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/online-symposium-strong-on-theory-while-profiling-
ignored/; Kevin Johnson, The Debate Over Immigration Reform Is Not Over Until It's Over,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2012, 8:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/online-symposium-the-
debate-over-immigration-reform-is-not-over-until-its-over/; Roberto Clintli Rodriguez, Racial Profiling
in Arizona: SB 1070 2(b) and Not to Be, TRUTHOUT (June 29, 2012, 1:11 PM), http://truth-
out.org/news/item/1 0071 -arizonas-sb- I 070-2b-and-not-to-be.
II Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507-11; id. at 2511-12- (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 2522-23 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2524-30 (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); See also David A. Martin, Reading Arizona, 98 VA. L. REV.
IN BRIEF 41, 44-45 (2012).
12 See, e.g., Charles, Recentering Foreign Affairs Preemption ,supra note 6, at 158.
13 See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 95 (2005); see also Brian R. Gallini & Elizabeth L. Young,
Car Stops, Borders, and Racial Profiling: The Hunt for Undocumented (Illegal?) Immigrants in Border
Towns, 89 NEB. L. REV. 709, 731-32 (2011) (discussing the constitutionality of immigration verifica-
tion in the constraints of the Fourth Amendment). But see Santos v. Frederick County Board of Com-
missioners, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16335, at 26 (4th Cir. 2013) ("absent express direction or authoriza-
tion by federal statute or federal officials, state and local law enforcement officials may not detain or
arrest an individual solely based on suspected civil violations of federal immigration law.").
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that a person is unlawfully present.14 Then there are the federal statutes that
require Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE) to respond to any
state and local inquiries regarding immigration status.15 When one applies
these legal facts to the text of Section 2(B), it would have been a complete
reversal of precedent and contrary to congressional intent if the law had not
survived a facial preemption challenge.16 Still, the survival of Section 2(B)
is not a carte blanche for state officials to detain persons suspected of being
unlawfully present.17 The Court majority was rather clear on this point,
stating, "[d]etaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status
would raise constitutional concerns." 18 It is here, that the Court majority
provided a hypothetical roadmap of "what to" and "what not to" do. On
the one hand, the majority found nothing wrong with the verification of
immigration status for lawful detentions so long as the state is within the
bounds of "federal direction and supervision." 19 On the other, immigration
verifications cannot result in "prolonged detention" as to violate the Fourth
Amendment.2 0 Unfortunately, no further guidance was provided, leaving it
to the lower courts to determine whether Section 2(B) and similar state
immigration verification laws are being enforced within the four corners of
the Constitution.2 1
14 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975) (holding that "[i]n all situations
the officer is entitled to assess the facts in light of his experience in detecting illegal entry and smug-
gling"); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (stating that race can be a factor used to ar-
ticulate "reasonable suspicion," but race can not be used as a pretext); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial
Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. Unit-
ed States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1006, 1023, 1075 (2010)
(arguing against the precedent that stipulates that race may be used as a factor in raising reasonable sus-
picion); Kathleen Kim, Perspectives on Immigration Reform, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1323, 1326 (2011)
(arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court has effectively authorized racial profiling in law enforcement).
15 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2012). ICE is proud of its cooperation
with state and local law enforcement agencies in this area. See Law Enforcement Support Center,
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, available at http://www.ice.gov/lesc/. See also HIROSHI
MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 127 (2014) ("The strongest signs of such permission [to
verify immigration status] are federal laws that outline a state or local role. Key is section 1373(c) of
title 8 of the United States Code, which requires the federal government to respond to state or local re-
quests to check any individual's citizenship or immigration status.").
16 See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509-10. A number of lower federal courts disagreed and preempted
the state immigration verification laws under a myriad of preemption theories. See United States v.
Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 349, 352 (9th Cir. 2011); Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal,
793 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1330, 1332, 1335-36 (N.D, Ga.201 1); United States v. South Carolina, 840 F.
Supp. 2d 898,914 (D. S.C.2011).
17 Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 718 (2013) (stating
the Supreme Court's ruling on 2(B) does not permit states to "engage in anti-unauthorized-immigrant
rulemaking when such action intrudes upon the federal government's plenary power to determine 'im-
migration' law.").
18 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509 (emphasis added).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 It is worth noting that a number of circuit court decisions have provided precedent addressing
this point. See Estrada v. Rhode Island, 594 F. 3d 56, 63-65 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Vasquez-
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And then there is the racial profiling question-can state immigration
verification laws be found unconstitutional on racial profiling grounds? As
Rick Su astutely points outs, the potential for racial profiling in state immi-
gration verification laws like Section 2(B) is "real and worrisome," but
nothing in them "directly encourages, authorizes, or otherwise expands
[the] practice." 22 In fact, of the five states that maintain lawful stop immi-
gration verification laws (see Chart I), not one permits racial profiling.
Each law requires state officials to adhere to the constitutional search, sei-
zure, and detention protections embodied by both the Fourth Amendment
and the respective state constitutional provision.2 3 Thus, unless precedent is
severely altered to eliminate race and immigration status as a factor for
raising a reasonable suspicion, state immigration verification laws must be
presumed a constitutional exercise of state authority.2 4
CHART I
PROMINENT STATE IMMIGRATION VERIFICATION LAWS APPLICABLE TO
LAWFUL STOPS
State Immigration Verification Pro- Ancillary Burden Protections
vision Provided by Law
Alabama Upon any lawful stop, deten- A person is presumed to not
tion, or arrest made by a state, be an alien who is unlawfully
county, or municipal law en- present in the United States if
forcement officer of this state the person provides to the law
in the enforcement of any enforcement officer any of the
state law or ordinance of any following: (1) A valid, unex-
political subdivision thereof, pired Alabama driver's li-
where reasonable suspicion cense. (2) A valid, unexpired
exists that the person is an al- Alabama nondriver identifica-
ien who is unlawfully present tion card.. .(4) Any valid
in the United States, a reason- United States federal or state
Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1297-98 (10th Cir. 1999); Gonzalez v. Peoria, 722 F. 2d 468, 474, 476 (9th
Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds; Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F. 3d 1037, 1043-44 (9th
Cir. 1999).
22 Rick Su, Arizona's New Immigration Law, 109 MICH L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 76, 77 (2010).
23 MO. REV. STAT. § 577.680 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-1003(B) (2011); IND. CODE. § 11-
10-1-2(a)(4) (2012); Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011. H.B. 87, Article 5(b)
(Ga. 2011); An Act Relating to Illegal Immigration, H.B. 56, § 12(a) (Ala. 2011).
24 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2516 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("And I know
of no reason why a protracted detention that does not violate the Fourth Amendment would contradict
or conflict with any federal immigration law.").
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able attempt shall be made,
when practicable, to deter-
mine the citizenship and im-
migration status of the person,
except if the determination
may hinder or obstruct an in-
vestigation. Such determina-
tion shall be made by contact-
ing the federal government
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c)
and relying upon any verifica-
tion provided by the federal
government.. .A law en-
forcement official or agency
of this state or a county, city,
or other political subdivision
of this state may not consider
race, color, or national origin
in the enforcement of this sec-
tion except to the extent per-
mitted by the United States
Constitution and the Constitu-
tion of Alabama of 1901.
For any lawful stop, detention
or arrest made by a law en-
forcement official or a law en-
forcement agency of this
state... where reasonable
suspicion exists that the per-
son is an alien who and is un-
lawfully present in the United
States, a reasonable attempt
shall be made, when practica-
ble, to determine the immigra-
tion status of the person, ex-
cept if the determination may
hinder or obstruct an investi-
gation. Any person who is ar-
rested shall have the person's
immigration status determined
before the person is released.
The person's immigration sta-
government issued identifica-
tion document bearing a pho-
tograph or other biometric
identifier, if issued by an enti-
ty that requires proof of lawful
presence in the United States
before issuance. (5) A foreign
passport with an unexpired
United States Visa and a cor-
responding stamp or notation
by the United States Depart-
ment of Homeland Security
indicating the bearer's admis-
sion to the United States. (6)
A foreign passport issued by a
visa waiver country with the
corresponding entry stamp and
unexpired duration of stay an-
notation or an 1-94W form by
the United States Department
of Homeland Security indicat-
ing the bearer's admission to
the United States.
A person is presumed to not
be an alien who is unlawfully
present in the United States if
the person provides to the law
enforcement officer or agency
any of the following: 1. A val-
id Arizona driver license. 2. A
valid Arizona nonoperating
identification license... 4. If
the entity requires proof of le-
gal presence in the United
States before issuance, any
valid United States federal,
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tus shall be verified with the
federal government pursuant
to 8 United States code sec-
tion 1373(c). A law enforce-
ment official or agency of this
state or a county, city, town or
other political subdivision of
this state may not solely con-
sider race, color or national
origin in implementing the re-
quirements of this subsection
except to the extent permitted
by the United States or Arizo-
na Constitution.
During any investigation of a
criminal suspect by a peace
officer, when such officer has
probable cause to believe that
a suspect has committed a
criminal violation, the officer
shall be authorized to seek to
verify such suspect's immi-
gration status when the sus-
pect is unable to provide
[proof].. .A peace officer
shall not consider race, color,
or national origin in imple-
menting the requirements of
this Code section except to the
extent permitted by the Con-
stitutions of Georgia and the
United States.
[Proof of immigration status is
met] when the suspect is able
to provide one of the follow-
ing: (1) A secure and verifia-
ble document as define in
Code Section 5-36-2; (2) A
valid Georgia driver's license;
(3) A valid Georgia identifica-
tion card issued by the De-
partment of Driver Services;
(4) if the entity requires proof
of legal presence in the United
State before issuance, any val-
id driver's license from a state
or district of the United States
or any valid identification
document issue by the United
States federal government; (5)
A document used in compli-
ance with paragraph (2) of
subsection (a) of Code Section
40-5-21; or Other information
as to the suspect's identity that
is sufficient to allow the peace
officer to independently iden-
tifv the susoect.
South 1 If a law enforcement officer of I If the person provides the of-
Georgia
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Carolina this State or a political subdi-
vision of this State lawfully
stops, detains, investigates, or
arrests a person for a criminal
offense, and during the com-
mission of the stop, detention,
investigation, or arrest the of-
ficer has reasonable suspicion
to believe that the person is
unlawfully present in the
United States, the officer shall
make a reasonable effort,
when practicable, to deter-
mine whether the person is
lawfully present in the United
States, unless the determina-
tion would hinder or obstruct
an investigation... A law en-
forcement officer may not at-
tempt to make an independent
judgment of a person's lawful
presence in the United States.
A law enforcement officer
may not consider race, color,
or national origin in imple-
menting this section, except to
the extent permitted by the
United States or South Caroli-
na Constitution. This section
must be implemented in a
manner that is consistent with
federal laws regulating immi-
gration, protecting the civil
rights of all persons, and re-
specting the privileges and
immunities of United States
citizens.
Utah Any law enforcement officer A person is presumed to be
who, acting in the enforce- lawfully present in the United
ment of any state law or local States for the purposes of this
ordinance, conducts any law- part if the person provides one
ful stop, detention, or arrest of of the following documents to
ficer with a valid form of any
of the following picture identi-
fications, the person is pre-
sumed to be lawfully present
in the United States: (a) a
driver's license or picture
identification issued by the
South Carolina Department of
Motor Vehicles; (b) a driver's
license or picture identifica-
tion issued by another state;
(c) a picture identification is-
sued by the United States, in-
cluding a passport or military
identification; or (d) a tribal
picture identification.
2014]
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a person.. .and the person is
unable to provide to the law
enforcement officer a docu-
ment listed in Subsection 76-
9-1004(1) and the officer is
otherwise unable to verify the
identity of the person, the of-
ficer... shall request verifica-
tion of the citizenship or the
immigration status of the per-
son under 8 U.S.C. Sec.
1373(c)... A law enforcement
officer may not consider race,
color, or national origin in
implementing this section, ex-
cept to the extent permitted by
the constitutions of the United
States and this state.
the law enforcement officer,
unless the law enforcement
officer has a reasonable suspi-
cion that the document is false
or identifies a person other
than the person providing the
document:
(a) a valid Utah driver license
issued on or after January 1,
2010;
(b) a valid Utah identification
card issued under Section 53-
3-804 and issued on or after
January 1, 2010;
(c) a valid tribal enrollment
card or other valid form of
tribal membership identifica-
tion that includes photo identi-
fication;
(d) a valid identification doc-
ument.. .A person is pre-
sumed to be a citizen or na-
tional of the United States for
purposes of this part if the
person makes a statement or
affirmation to the law en-
forcement officer that the per-
son is a United States citizen
or national, unless the officer
has a reasonable suspicion that
the statement or affirmation is
false.
Still, this does not mean that state immigration verification laws are
completely saved from preemption. As this Article sets forth to discuss,
the Court majority was correct to leave the question unsettled, 25 for once
state immigration verification laws are put into force, there remains the
question of whether the laws can be enforced objectively as to not impose
25 Id. at 2510 ("The nature and timing of this case counsel caution in evaluating the validity of §
2(B).").
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ancillary burdens on aliens lawfully present. 26 Providing an answer to this
question first requires an examination of each state law's text and structure.
If the law's text does not impose ancillary burdens and serves the purpose
of deterring unlawful immigration, it is constitutionally permissible. Con-
versely, if the law does impose ancillary burdens outside of what federal
law already prescribes, it is preempted. Surviving the first step does not
end the inquiry. Although the text of the law proves to be constitutionally
objective, it does not preclude that there is sufficient evidence that the law
is being subjectively enforced. In other words, if there is sufficient evi-
dence that state officials are enforcing the law disproportionately based on
race, ethnicity or country of origin, the law cannot be enforced objectively,
and is therefore unconstitutional.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE IMMIGRATION VERIFICATION LAWS
UNDER TRADITIONAL PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
Since its first immigration preemption case in 1837, the Supreme Court
has consistently held that state authority over immigration is limited to its
historic police powers, or when the state regulation works in accordance
with federal policy as to not impede or impose new conditions on lawful
residence. 27 Meanwhile, any state regulation that may affect or disrupt the
federal scheme concerning the entrance, expulsion, removal or conditions
of residence is preempted because it impedes on United States' foreign pol-
icy objectives. 28
26 See Charles, Recentering Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 6, at 156 (discussing that the
Section 2(B) could be susceptible to foreign affairs preemption).
27 New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 137-38 (1837) ("whilst a state is acting within the legitimate
scope of its power as to the end to be attained, it may use whatsoever means, being appropriate to that
end, it may think fit; although they may be the same, or so nearly the same, as scarcely to be distin-
guishable from those adopted by congress acting under a different power: subject, only, say the Court,
of the state must yield to the law of congress. The Court must be understood, of course, as meaning that
the law of congress is passed upon a subject within its sphere of power.").
28 Id. at 142-43. See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312. U.S. 52, 65-67 (1941) ("Legal imposition of
distinct, unusual and extraordinary burdens and obligation upon aliens-such as subjecting them alone,
though perfectly law-abiding, to indiscriminate and repeated interception and interrogation by public
officials-thus bears an inseparable relationship to the welfare and tranquility of all the states, and not
merely to the welfare and tranquility of one. Laws imposing such burdens are not mere census re-
quirements, and even though they may be immediately associated with the accomplishment of a local
purpose, they provoke questions in the field of international affairs... And where the federal govern-
ment, in the exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation
and has therein provided a standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the
purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce addi-
tional or auxiliary regulations."); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 n.6 (1976) ("State laws which
impose discriminatory burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within the United
States conflict with this constitutionally derived federal power to regulate immigration, and have ac-
2014]
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On their face, state immigration verification laws like Section 2(B) do
not violate these overlying principles under either express or implied
preemption doctrines.2 9 Beginning with express preemption, there is noth-
ing in the federal immigration scheme that expressly prohibits state and lo-
cal law enforcement from inquiring about immigration status. In fact, the
federal immigration scheme, particularly 8 U.S.C §§ 1357(g) (10) and
1373(c), makes it unlawful for any state or locality to prohibit the transmis-
sion of immigration data as a means "to cooperate with the Attorney Gen-
eral in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not
lawfully present."30 Thus, the Supreme Court was correct to hold the feder-
al scheme "leaves room for a policy requiring state officials to contact ICE
as a routine matter." 31
In terms of implied preemption, there are two doctrines-conflict
preemption and obstacle preemption. Conflict preemption occurs "where
compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibil-
ity,"32 and obstacle preemption takes place when state laws "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and ob-
jectives of Congress." 33 The reason that obstacle preemption is a non-issue
rests on the fact that both the federal immigration scheme and state verifi-
cation immigration laws serve the same objective of detecting and deterring
unlawful immigration.34 Put another way, to trigger obstacle preemption
would have required a finding that the federal scheme does not seek to
identify, detain, and remove unlawful immigrants. The text and history of
the federal immigration laws cannot conceivably support such a conclu-
sion.
Implied preemption analysis, however, was not so easily satisfied. On
the one hand, when the constitutionality of Section 2(B) was before the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the three judge panel was correct to ques-
cordingly been held invalid.") (emphasis added).
29 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 376-79.
30 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2012).
31 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 377.
32 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 589 (2009) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)).
33 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
34 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently made an important distinction between state laws
that deter or prevent unlawful immigration and those that regulate the entry, exit, and residence of im-
migrants as a whole:
"Laws designed to deter, or even prohibit, unlawfully present aliens from residing within a particular
locality are not tantamount to immigration laws establishing who may enter or remain in the country.
Indeed, Plaintiffs' expansive notion of constitutional and field preemption is contrary to decisions of the
Supreme Court expressly recognizing that a State may enact an otherwise valid law7 that deters unlaw-
fully present aliens from residing within the State, notwithstanding the federal government's exclusive
power in controlling the nation's borders." Keller v. City of Fremont, 791 F.3d 931, 941(8th Cir. 2013).
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tion the states compelling law enforcement to verify immigration status
during lawful stops. 35 A cursory reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) shows that
Congress established a system for state and local law enforcement officials
to enforce immigration law-the 287(g) program.
By entering into an agreement with the Attorney General, the state or lo-
cality's officials would "be qualified to perform a function of an immigra-
tion officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of
aliens in the United States." 36 Thus, one may argue that any verification of
immigration status at the state level, absent a federal agreement to do so,
conflicts with Congress's purpose of establishing a system for states and
political subdivisions to enforce federal immigration law.
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit's reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) fal-
tered in that it is nonsensical. Reading the statute in its entirety, not piece-
meal, indicates the 287(g) program makes state and local officials the near
equivalent of federal immigration officials. 37 In other words, political sub-
divisions that enter into the 287(g) program may enforce portions of federal
immigration law when in contact with an unlawfully present immigrant, of-
ten without the express direction of a federal official.38 Indeed, the 287(g)
program places the state or local officials under the "direction and supervi-
sion of the Attorney General," 39 but this does not preclude state and local
officials from making independent immigration decisions when necessary.
This understanding of congressional purposes and objectives for the
287(g) program is supported by the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1). For an
official to be "qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in
relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens" is to have
some independent authority to act.4 0 In contrast, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)
does not grant state and local officials any discretionary authority. It mere-
ly authorizes communication with federal officials by requiring "coop-
erat[ion] with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, de-
tention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States." 41
There is a substantial difference between having federal investigatory au-
thority, and cooperating with the Attorney General to identify unlawfully
present aliens. The former is quasi-independent authority under the color
of federal law, and the latter requires the full cooperation and assistance of
35 United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 352-53 (9th Cir. 2011).
36 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2012).
37 Id. at § 1357(g)(2) -(3), (8).
38 See Gallini & Young, supra note 13, at 73031.
39 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3).
40 Id. § 1357(g)(1) (emphasis added).
41 Id. § 1357(g)(10) (emphasis added).
2014]
452 JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 27:3
the federal authorities.
Therefore, there can be no implied preemption to state immigration veri-
fication laws that require full cooperation with federal authorities. Unless
state or local officials are compelled to make independent determinations
of an individual's immigration status, the law is a constitutional exercise of
state authority. Here again, the Supreme Court agreed. The Arizona ma-
jority held that "it would disrupt the federal framework to put state officers
in the position of holding aliens in custody for possible unlawful presence
without federal direction and supervision." 4 2 The question the Court re-
fused to answer, however, is whether Section 2(B) and other state immigra-
tion verification laws will be enforced in a manner that does not cooperate
with federal authorities, for the Court felt there remains "a basic uncertain-
ty about what the laws mean and how it will be enforced." 43
It is for this reason that the interpretation and application of text becomes
crucial to the constitutionality of state immigration verification laws. For-
tunately, for its proponents, the overwhelming majority of state immigra-
tion verification laws require a federal determination of immigration status
before the person may be detained by state officials. For instance, Utah's
Code requires any verification of immigration status to be submitted to the
Department of Homeland Security in accordance with 8 U.S.C. §
1373(c). 44 In such cases, immigration verifications can only take place by
Utah law enforcement officials when a "reasonable suspicion" is present in
accordance with the United States and Utah Constitutions. 45
Georgia's H.B. 87 similarly requires that state officials check the immi-
gration status of suspected unlawful aliens in accordance with 8 U.S.C. §
1373(c), but stipulates a higher "probable cause" standard instead of mere
"reasonable suspicion." 46 Moreover, Georgia's verification law prohibits
the use of "race, color, or national origin" for the officer to articulate the
necessary probable cause. 47
Even Alabama's controversial 48 H.B. 56 is not a freewheeling exercise
of state police authority. The law requires both a "reasonable suspicion" of
unlawful status and cooperation with the federal immigration scheme:
42 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 377.
43 Id. at 378.
44 UTAH CODE § 76-9-1003(1)(a)(i) (2012).
45 Id. §§ 76-9-1003(2)(a)-(b) (2012).
46 Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011. H.B. 87, Art. 5(b) (Ga. 2011).
47 Id., Art. 5(d).
48 See, e.g., Keith Rushing, Alabama's HB56 Shows Racism Still Part of State Culture, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/keith-rushing/alabamas-
immigration-law_b_992801.html (improperly claiming Alabama's immigration verification law "re-
quires" racial profiling).
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Upon any lawful stop, detention, or arrest made by a state, county, or
municipal law enforcement officer of this state in the enforcement of any
state law or ordinance of any political subdivision thereof, where reasona-
ble suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in
the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to
determine the citizenship and immigration status of the person, except if
the determination may hinder or obstruct an investigation. Such determina-
tion shall be made by contacting the federal government pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1373(c) and relying upon any verification provided by the federal
government. 49
Of course, state immigration verification laws are not limited in applica-
tion to lawful stops. A number of states require the verification of all per-
sons booked and jailed. These laws serve the purpose of assisting in the
enforcement of federal immigration law by identifying unlawful aliens that
have already been charged with a violation of state law. Such laws are less
susceptible to traditional preemption doctrine because the verification is
less likely to intrude into the federal sphere or raise Fourth Amendment
concerns. In other words, these laws (a) do not regulate immigration law
within the federal sphere, (b) fall within a state's sphere of criminal law
without undermining the federal scheme, and (c) do not impose discrimina-
tory burdens given the verification takes place after a person is charged
with a state crime. 50 However, as with state laws compelling officials to
verify immigration status during lawful stops, the constitutionality of these
laws requires the verification to be in accordance with the federal authori-
ties (see Chart II for summary). 51 Any federally independent decision must
be preempted as inconsistent with congressional intent.
CHART II
THREE LEVELS OF PREEMPTION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
awful Stop Verification ICriminal Verification
Express Preem tion No, federal immigration No, federal immigration
49 An Act Relating to Illegal Immigration, H.B. 56, §12(a) (Ala. 2011).
50 These factors are important in terms of preemption doctrine. See. Charles, Recentering Foreign
Affairs Preemption, supra note 6, at 157.
51 Indiana's Code provides a constitutionally objective example in this regard. Section 11-10-1-
2(a)(4) requires all "committed criminal offender[s]" to have their immigration status checked in ac-
cordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). INDIANA CODE § 11-10-1-2(a)(4) (2012).
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law does not expressly law does not expressly
prohibit the states from prohibit the states from
passing immigration ver- passing immigration ver-
ification laws. ification laws.
Obstacle Preemp- No, the federal immigra- No, the federal immigra-
tion tion scheme and state tion scheme and state
verification laws both verification laws both
seek to detect and deter seek to detect and deter
unlawful immigration. unlawful immigration.
Conflict Preemp- No, so long as law re- No, so long as law re-
tion quires federal identifica- quires federal identifica-
tion of immigration sta- tion of immigration sta-
tus in accordance with tus in accordance with
federal law. federal law.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE IMMIGRATION VERIFICATION LAWS
UNDER FOREIGN AFFAIRS PREEMPTION
In addition to traditional express and implied preemption doctrines there
is a third tier of preemption that I have referred to in a previous writing as
foreign affairs preemption.5 2 It stipulates that state or local immigration
laws will be preempted if they (1) regulate a facet of immigration policy
solely within the federal sphere of government, 53 (2) regulate immigration
outside the traditional state or local government's sphere or in a manner
that undermines the federal scheme, 54 or (3) if the laws impose discrimina-
tory burdens on the alien class as a whole-lawful and unlawful. 55
This three-part inquiry is consistent with the intent behind ratifying the
Constitution to ensure a "more perfect Union." 56 The founding generation
52 Charles, Recentering Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 6, at 145.
53 See Miln, 36 U.S. at 132-139; Hines, 312 U.S. at 62-63; DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354-55; Plyer,
457 U.S. at225; Toll, 458 U.S. at 11.
54 See Hines, 312 U.S. at 66; DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 356-62; Plyer, 457 U.S. at 225; Toll, 458 U.S.
at 14-17.
55 See Hines, 312 U.S. at 69; DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 358 n.6; Plyer, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19; Toll, 458
U.S. at 13. For a three-part approach to foreign affairs preemption generally, to include immigration
preemption issues, see Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law, A Recommended Analysis, 83
A.J.I.L. 832 (1989) ("a court must (1) determine whether the state law falls within the realm of accepta-
ble state authority; (2) determine whether the state act in question touches on matters relating to foreign
affairs; and (3) balance the value of achieving a nationally uniform position against the value of giving
effect to the local decision making on the question involved, to arrive at a decision that accurately re-
flects the appropriate roles of the states and the nation in regulating the subject matter concemed.").
56 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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understood that any powers touching upon immigration, foreign affairs,
naturalization, and citizenship must be centralized with the federal gov-
ernment as to prevent foreign embarrassments at the state level. 57 A num-
ber of commentators are indeed correct to point out that there is no mention
of "immigration," "aliens," or "immigrants" in the Constitution's text,58 but
the law of nations unquestionably vested immigration powers, i.e. entry,
settlement, expulsion, and conditions of settlement, with the nation state,
not its subcomponents.59
This is what makes Justice Antonin Scalia's opinion in Arizona v. United
States so puzzling. Scalia asserts that "after the adoption of the Constitu-
tion there was some doubt about the power of the Federal Government to
control immigration, but no doubt about the power of the States to do so."60
The historical record does not support this conclusion, for the Constitution
was ratified to prevent the states from causing foreign embarrassments and
controversies, not to enable them to do so. In the words of then Chief Jus-
tice John Jay before a grand jury after the adoption of the Constitution,
"We had become a nation-as such we were responsible to others for the
observance of the law of nations; and as our national concerns were to be
regulated by national laws, national tribunals became necessary for the in-
terpretation and execution of them both."61
In the late eighteenth century, the law of nations included every coun-
try's right to legislate over foreigners. 62 As John Marshall once stated at
oral argument, every nation has the "right to legislate over foreigners," and
57 See Patrick J. Charles, The Plenary Power Doctrine and the Constitutionality of Ideological
Exclusions: An Historical Perspective, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 61, 92-101 (2010)[hereinafter The Ple-
nary Power Doctrine]; Charles, Recentering Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 6, at 152. The
need for federal supremacy over citizenship was affirmed by the Fourteenth Amendment, which over-
ruled Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). See Patrick J. Charles, Decoding the Fourteenth
Amendment's Citizenship Clause: Unlawful Immigrants, Allegiance, Personal Subjection, and the Law,
51 WASHBURN L.J. 211, 229, 236 (2012) [hereinafter Decoding the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizen-
ship Clause].
58 For some prominent articles that ignored the rich history of the plenary power doctrine in our
constitutional jurisprudence see generally Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereign-
ty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and it Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REv. 853 (1987); Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law after a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory In-
terpretation, 100 YALE. L.J. 545 (1990); Gabriel J. Chin, Is There Really a Plenary Power Doctrine?: A
Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange But Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law,
14 GEO. IMMIGR. L. REV. 257 (2000).
59 See Charles, The Plenary Power Doctrine, supra note 55, at 92-118.
60 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2513 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis add-
ed).
61 JOHN JAY, CHARGE TO THE GRAND JURY OF ULSTER COUNTY (1777) AND CHARGE TO THE
GRAND JURIES (1790), available at http://johnjayinstitute.org/resources/publications (emphasis added).
62 See, e.g., EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS §§ 213, 218 (1797).
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this power "goes to the rights of all kinds."63 Marshall was not the only
prominent member of the founding generation to come to this conclusion.
Associate Justice William Cushing, 64 Associate Justice James Iredell,65
Pennsylvania Judge Alexander Addison,66 James Madison, 67 and Alexan-
der Hamilton,68 all provide historical guideposts illustrating that immigra-
tion was an issue of national concern in accordance with the Constitution
and law of nations.
A 1793 charge to the grand jury by John Jay only further illuminates this
point. Jay stated the "laws of the United States" fell under "three heads or
descriptions":
1 st. All treaties made under the authority of the United States.
2d. The laws of nations.
3d. The constitution and statutes of the United States. 69
Jay defined the law of nations as consisting of "those laws by which na-
tions are bound to regulate their conduct towards one another" and "those
duties, as well as rights, which spring in relation from nation to nation." 70
Relying on the influential writings of Emer De Vattel,71 Jay discussed the
interrelation between immigration, allegiance, and national sovereignty as
follows:
The respect which every nation owes to itself imposes a du-
ty on its government to cause all its laws to be respected
63 James Iredell, Middle Circuit, 1793, Virginia 10 (1793) (unpublished journal of oral arguments,
on file with the Library of Congress Rare Books Division, Washington, D.C.).
64 See The Honorable Judge Cushing, A Charge Delivered to the Federal Grand Jury for the Dis-
trict of Virginia, on the 23d Nov. 1798: By the Honorable Judge Cushing, published by request of the
Grand Jury, THE EASTERN HERALD AND GAZETTE OF MAINE, January 21, 1799, Vol. XV.
65 CLAYPOOLE'S DAILY ADVERTISER (Philadelphia, PA), May 16, 1799, at 2, cols. 3-4.
66 See ALEXANDER ADDISON, ON THE ALIEN ACT: A CHARGE TO THE GRAND JURIES OF THE
COUNTY COURTS OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 11 (John Colerick ed.,
1799); ALEXANDER ADDISON, ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE VIRGINIA
ASSEMBLY 21 (Philadelphia, 1800). For the importance of Alexander Addison in American constitu-
tional jurisprudence, see Patrick J. Charles, Originalism, John Marshall, and the Necessary and Proper
Clause: Resurrecting the Jurisprudence of Alexander Addison, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 529, 529-50
(2010).
67 For a summary of James Madison's views, see Charles, The Plenary Power Doctrine, supra
note 55, at 100-1, 107, 116.
68 See 25 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 491-95 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1977) (discussing
the national politics of admitting foreigners into the United States).
69 THE CITY GAZETTE AND DAILY ADVERTISER (Charleston, SC), August 14, 1793, at 2, col. 1.
70 Id. at col. 1.
71 The writings of Vattel were highly influential on the founding generation's view of international
law. See Charles, The Plenary Power Doctrine, supra note 55, at 85-89, 108.
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and obeyed; and that not only by its proper citizens, but also
by those strangers who may visit and. occasionally reside
within its territories. There is no principle better estab-
lished, than that all strangers admitted into a country are,
during their residence, subject to the laws of it; and if they
violate the laws, they are to be punished according to the
laws.. .to maintain order and safety. 72
In sum, once we combine the historical record with the long line of Su-
preme Court precedent affirming federal plenary authority over immigra-
tion, 73 it is difficult to ascertain how anyone can conclude the states main-
tain inherent authority over immigration. 74 This is not to say that the states
do not retain any authority over their respective borders through their re-
spective political institutions or tailoring state privileges and immunities to
attract or deter immigrants. 75 These areas of law are unquestionably a mat-
ter of state sovereignty, which can be politically tailored to attract or deter
immigrants into respective jurisdictions. 76 However, to claim that the states
maintain some form of concurrent or inherent supplementary immigration
power would be to take a step back to the problematic Articles of Confed-
eration.77
Now when examining the constitutionality of state immigration verifica-
tion laws within the constraints of this history and foreign affairs preemp-
tion three questions must be raised. First, do these laws regulate a facet of
immigration policy solely within the federal sphere of government? Se-
cond, do the laws regulate immigration outside the traditional state or local
government's sphere or in a manner that undermines the federal scheme?
72 FRANCIS WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF
WASHINGTON AND ADAMS (1849).
73 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651, 659 (1892); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893); United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 672 (1897); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 289-90
(1904); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153 (1945); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89
(1952); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-66 (1972); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678. 695-96 (2001); Negusie v. Holder, 555
U.S. 511, 516-17 (2009).
74 See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Lo-
cal Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REv. 179, 181 (2005).
75 U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cl. 1. For a legal analysis of state powers over representation and ex-
cluding alien classes, see Patrick J. Charles, Representation Without Documentation?: Unlawfully Pre-
sent Aliens, the Doctrine ofAllegiance, and the Law, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 35, 41-45 (2011).
76 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1799-
1800 (1833).
77 See, e.g., id. § 1098; WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 79 (1825); ST. GEORGE TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
WITH SELECTED WRITINGS 197 (Clyde N. Wilson fwd., 1999).
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Lastly, do the laws impose any discriminatory burdens on the alien class as
a whole?
The answer to the first and second questions must be answered in the
negative. As discussed earlier in the expressed and implied preemption
analyses, 78 federal law expressly permits state officials "to cooperate with
the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or re-
moval of aliens not lawfully present." 79 Part of this cooperation includes
the identification of unlawfully present aliens in accordance with federal
law.8 0 So long as state immigration verification laws do not compel offi-
cials to enforce immigration law without federal direction, the laws cannot
be foreign affairs preempted, for they do not regulate immigration outside
the traditional state or local government's sphere nor in a manner that un-
dermines the federal scheme.
This brings us to the third and last question: "Do state immigration veri-
fication laws impose any discriminatory burdens on the alien class as a
whole?" There is no question that a number of immigration professors and
advocates have denounced the general verification of immigration status,
except when necessary, as an immoral practice that can lead to racial profil-
ing.8 1 As politically viable as this argument may be, it detracts from the ob-
jective constitutionality inquiry.
In particular, such meshing of political preference with constitutional
analysis fails in that it is not the law of the land, either through the text and
purpose of the Constitution or Supreme Court precedent. With the excep-
tion of a child's right to access public education,82 it remains a part of our
jurisprudence that unlawful immigrants are not a constitutionally protected
class, nor do they maintain any privacy rights to prevent detection.83 Even
if one applies this same political argument to lawful aliens, it expressly
conflicts with the constitutionally recognized principle that aliens may be
subject to legal conditions as the basis of their settlement. One of these
conditions is "[e]very alien, eighteen years of age and over, shall at all
times carry... any certificate of alien registration or alien registration re-
78 See supra Part I, at 7-11.
79 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B).
80 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).
81 See sources cited supra note 7 (listing articles in which the author advocates that the laws lead
to racial profiling).
82 See Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
83 See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 358 n.6 ("State laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon the
entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within the United States conflict with this constitutionally de-
rived federal power to regulate immigration, and have accordingly been held invalid.") (emphasis add-
ed) (quoting Takashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948)); see also Toll v. Moreno,
458 U.S. I, 12-13 (1982) (stating the question turns on whether the law discriminates against "lawfully
admitted" aliens in a manner not contemplated by Congress).
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ceipt card issued[.]" 84 The United States is not alone nor was it the first na-
tion to require personal subjection as a condition of settlement. 85 The sub-
mission of an alien to the host country as the tacit condition of entry and
settlement is a legal principle that is not only part of our Anglo-American
tradition, 86 but is an international norm. 87 Not to mention, the approval to
maintain one's presence in a host country does not end at the port of em-
barkation. It is within the sovereign power of each nation to check the
identity or immigration status of foreigners they come into lawful contact
with.
While the verification of immigration status may serve the legal purpose
of deterring unlawful immigration, there remains the question of whether
the laws can be enforced without the "indiscriminate and repeated intercep-
tion and interrogation [of aliens] by public officials" as to impose "unusual
and extraordinary burdens" not contemplated by Congress.88 A myriad of
racial profiling concerns are presented. Perhaps aliens who do not speak
English will be profiled, and persistently burdened to confirm proof of im-
migration status. Perhaps persons of a particular color, race, or ethnicity
will experience additional questioning beyond what others experience, even
if they speak fluent English. The racial profiling possibilities are endless if
one seriously gives pause to consider.
Unfortunately, the potential for racial profiling is prevalent in most laws
should the respective law enforcement agency seek, plan, or conspire to do
s0.89 This is something that no law can eliminate regardless of how careful-
ly drafted.90 It is a behavioral choice that can only be deterred through edu-
cation, training, and legal consequences. Still, for the purpose of objectivi-
ty, it is worth weighing the evidentiary claims that state immigration
enforcement encourages unconstitutional racial profiling.
One common argument is that state verification laws require "law en-
forcement officers to stop everyone whom they have a 'reasonable suspi-
84 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (2012).
85 See Thomas Ehrlich, Passports, 19 STAN. L. REV. 129 (1966) (detailing the history of United
States and international passport controls).
86 See Charles, The Plenary Power Doctrine, supra note 55, at 68-119 (giving a historical over-
view of Anglo-American immigration law, including the principle of submission).
87 See Charles, Decoding the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause, supra note 55, at,
237-45 (discussing the doctrines of allegiance and personal subjection).
88 Hines, 312 U.S. at 65-66.
89 For some scholarship in this area, see Abraham Abramovsky and Jonathan I. Edelstein, Pretext
Stops and Racial Profiling After Whren v. United States: The New York and New Jersey Responses
Compared, 63 ALB. L. REV. 725 (2000); Ira Glasser, American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow, 63
ALB. L. REV. 703 (2000); Phyllis W. Beck and Patricia A. Daly, State Constitutional Analysis of Pretext
Stops: Racial Profiling and Public Policy Concerns, 72 TEMPLE L. REV. 597 (1999).
90 It can be minimized, but not eliminated. See Jeff Dominitz, How Do the Laws of Probability
Constrain Legislative and Judicial Efforts to Stop Racial Profiling, 5 AM. LAW ECON. REV. 412 (2003).
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cion' to believe is an undocumented immigrant and arrest them if they fail
to produce their papers." 9 1 It is what Marjorie Cohen refers to as criminal-
izing "walking while brown,"92 but this is a complete misreading of statu-
tory text. At no point do any of the state verification laws require officials
to "stop everyone" as Cohen contends. Instead, the laws stipulate the con-
ditions that must arise to verify immigration status during lawful stops and
encounters, i.e. lack of identification and other factors. 93 As a counterpoint
to this racial profiling argument, it has been asserted that the state laws
provide more protection than current federal guidelines, thus any racial pro-
filing concerns are overstated. 94 A number of immigration law professors
respectfully disagree. They assert it is the acquiescence of race as a con-
sideration that will ultimately lead to unconstitutional racial profiling.95
Here again, this is nothing more than speculation. The potential for ra-
cial profiling in state immigration verification laws is indeed "real and wor-
risome," but nothing in them "directly encourages, authorizes, or otherwise
expands [the] practice." 96 Certainly more legislative protections could deter
the potential for racial profiling, such as requiring law enforcement agen-
cies to track the law's implementation. This would provide the data neces-
sary to hold state law enforcement agencies accountable and tailor the
law's enforcement accordingly. However, until immigration verification
data is accumulated, all anyone can do is speculate that the laws will result
into a myriad of civil rights violations.
It should be noted here that even before state immigration verification
laws were enacted, verification of immigration status was already taking
place accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10). In these instances, state and
local law enforcement were not required to verify immigration status in ac-
cordance with state law. The officer maintained individual discretion in
contacting Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).97 And despite
91 Cohn, Arizona Legalizes Racial Profiling, supra note 9.
92 Id. See also lRushing, supra note 46, ("It's obvious that police will make these judgments of
who to investigate based on appearance, including skin color.").
93 For a recent example as to how state law enforcement officials may constitutionally determine
whether to inquire about immigration status, see United States v. Ovando-Garzo, 2014 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10062 (8th Cir. 2014) (upholding the state law enforcement official's inquiry into the passen-
ger's immigration status).
94 Hans Von Spakovsky, The Arizona Immigration Law: Racial Discrimination Prohibited, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (October 1, 2010), available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/10/the-arizona-immigration-law-racial-discrimination-
prohibited.
95 Chin, et al, supra note 7, at 65-72; Kevin R. Johnson, A Case of Color-Blindness: The Racially
Disparate Impacts of Arizonas SB 1070 and the Failure of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, I
ARIZ. ST. L.J. SOCIAL JUSTICE 1, 17-21 (2011).
96 Su, Arizona's New Immigration Law, supra note 21, at 77.
97 ICE is proud of its cooperation with state and local law enforcement agencies in this area. See
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this already existent enforcement at the state and federal levels, there has
yet to be a study affirmatively linking immigration verification with racial
profiling.
This includes lawful vehicular stops, which are statistically monitored by
most states. Certainly, immigration rights groups and liberal immigration
law professors may continue to claim otherwise, but their evidentiary links
are tenuous and built on personal suspicions rather than hard data.98 Ac-
cording to the United States Bureau of Justice statistics, national traffic
stops are being conducted nearly proportionate to race; white (8.4%), black
(8.8%), and Hispanic (9.1%).99 In other words, the potential for persons to
be questioned about their immigration status during vehicular stops is not
disproportionate according to race. This does not negate that there may be
certain police districts or officials that intentionally profile based on race,
but there is no substantiated evidence this will be the result of state immi-
gration enforcement as a whole.100
A study by the reputable Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race,
Law Enforcement Support Center, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, available at
http://www.ice.gov/lesc/. See also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2526 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
98 There are numerous claims, but no studies. See Laura W. Murphy, The Three Faces of Racial
Profiling: The ACLU Connects the Dots, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION BLOG OF RIGHTS (Oct. 18,
2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/three-faces-racial-profiling-acu-connects-
dots; Faces of Racial Profiling: A Report From Communities Across America, RIGHTS WORKING
GROUP (October), available at http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/sites/default/files/ReportText.pdf;
Briefing Guide to Secure Communities, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, NAT'L DAY LABORER
ORG. NETWORK AND CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC (August 2, 2010),
available at
http://ccrjustice.org/,iles/Secure%2OCommunities%2Fact%2Sheet%2OBriefing%20guide%208-2-
2010%2OProduction.pdf There are also studies claiming federal immigration and border patrol officials
unconstitutionally engage in racial profiling. However, the studies lack the sufficient data points to
prove their racial profiling claims. See The Growing Human Rights Crisis Along Washington's North-
ern Border, ONE AMERICAN AND UNIV. OF WASHINGTON CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 17, 2012),
available at
https://www.weareoneamerica.org/sites/weareoneamerica.org/files/EXECSU vM_northermborder-
FINAL.pdf (claiming racial profiling exists along the Washington state and Canada border through per-
sonal interviews, but without any substantive statistics or data points); Justice Derailed: What Raids on
New York's Trains and Buses Reveal about Border Patrol's Interior Enforcement Practices, N.Y. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, NYU SCHOOL OF LAW IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC, AND FAMILIES FOR FREEDOM
(November 2011), available at
http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/NYCLUjusticederailedweb 0.pdf (admitting the bias that the
study denounces the verification of immigration status as a violation of privacy and Fourth Amendment
rights, and then claims racial profiling without providing enough substantive statistics or data points
other than to the percentage of arrests based upon complexion).
99 Traffic Stops, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=702 (last updated Feb. 4, 2012).
100 A similar fear spread with the implementation of employer sanctions when Congress was de-
bating the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. It was feared that employers would discriminate,
causing hardships on persons of Hispanic background. However, those fears were nothing more than
that. The law did not result in racial profiling. For a legislative history, see Brief for Amicus Curiae
Immigration Reform Law Institute Supporting Respondents, at 21-28, Chamber of Commerce v. Whit-
ing, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (No. 09-115).
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Ethnicity & Diversity has provided the most detailed data set asserting oth-
erwise.10 1 The study examined ICE's Criminal Alien Program (CAP) in Ir-
ving, Texas from September 2006 to November 2007. The CAP seeks to
target the deportation of criminal aliens booked or processed in state and
local jails.102 Although the CAP is designed to target deportable aliens with
criminal histories, the study convincingly shows that aliens with civil im-
migration violations were deported at a substantially higher rate than crim-
inal aliens.103 It is from this conclusion that the study infers cooperation
with ICE led the Irving Police Department to engage in racial profiling. 104
A general glance at the study's tables and data seems to support this
stance. Yet a closer look at the evidence reveals the conclusions are mere
inferences that lack sufficient data points. For instance, the study argues
that racial profiling is proven by two data sets. The first is a chart tracking
the overall arrests of persons according to race. Excluding the month of
July 2007, the percentage of arrests according to race remained consistent
with census data. If anything, the data shows that persons of white com-
plexion were arrested at a higher rate than Hispanics when they constituted
7% less of the population total.105 July 2007 was arguably the only month
in which Hispanics were arrested consistently with census data according
to race.
The second data set is much more problematic. Upon the implementa-
tion of the CAP, the chart indicates that the arrests of Hispanics for Class-C
misdemeanors rose exponentially before tailing off.106 Because arrests for
Class-C misdemeanors are at the discretion of the officer, the study con-
cludes that race proved instrumental in that discretion. What the study fails
to take into account is the two additional data sets necessary to make this
connection: (a) data on the nature of the misdemeanor and (b) data on
101 Trevor Gardner II and Aarti Kohli, The C.A.P. Effect: Racial Profiling in the ICE Criminal
Alien Program, THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY (Sept.
2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief irving_FINAL.pdf.
102 Criminal Alien Program, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, available at
http://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program/.
103 Gardner & Kohli, supra note 97, at 7.
104 See id. at 1, 4, 8. The Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute has published a separate report that
also makes the claim that federal-state cooperation through Secure Communities leads to racial profil-
ing. AARTI KOHLI, PETER L. MARKOWITZ, & LISA CHAVEZ, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS:
ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS, 3, October 2011, available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/SecureCOMMUNITIEs_bytheNumbers.pdf. Their claim is based
upon the percentage of Latinos located and deported through the program-ninety-three percent. Id. at
5. However, the study gives no empirical proof that Latinos are being targeted.
105 Gardner & Kohli, supra note 97, at 5.
106 See id. at 5. The tailoring off could be the result of institutional policy changes or that unlawful
immigrants began to migrate elsewhere in fear of deportation. The study does not provide any evidence
to prove either conclusion.
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whether Class-C misdemeanors rose as a whole.
The nature of the misdemeanor is rather important. A general compari-
son of the increase in Hispanic traffic arrests with the overall Hispanic ar-
rests during the same period reveals that the July 2007 rise was almost sole-
ly the result of traffic violations. 107 It is likely that these arrests were the
result of driving without a valid license (a Class-C misdemeanor in Texas),
lack of insurance or valid immigration papers, and other potential factors
that would lead a reasonably prudent officer to inquire about immigration
status. It would be upon this inquiry and checking with ICE about issuing a
detainer that the officer likely made an arrest. Circumstances like this do
not indicate racial profiling, but the active enforcement of federal immigra-
tion law at the state level. The two are very distinct in terms of constitu-
tionality. The former (deliberate racial profiling) is unconstitutional, and
the latter (enforcing the law and cooperating with federal authorities) is
constitutional.
It must be noted, however, the circumstances of the vehicular stops men-
tioned above are merely speculation. The study never sought to answer this
all important question, nor did it track data of vehicular stops as a whole.
Thus, many questions are left unanswered in order to affirmatively link ra-
cial profiling with state and local immigration enforcement. Did vehicular
stops rise upon the implementation of the CAP? Did the racial composition
of vehicular stops rise or change dramatically? Did the arresting officer
first arrest the person and contact ICE later or did the officer contact ICE
after a reasonable suspicion of unlawful status?
The lack of sufficient data points on vehicular stops also applies to law-
ful stops or investigations for breaches of the peace and drunken behav-
ior.108 Did the lawful stops increase as a result of the CAP or did the offic-
ers merely become aware that they could legally cooperate with federal
authorities? The answer to this question is significant, for the officers may
have been unaware of their ability to cooperate with ICE, unfamiliar with
detecting fraudulent immigration documents, and other immigration en-
forcement procedures before partnering with ICE.
Overall, the study does not prove what it contends-i.e. racial profiling
increases when state and local law enforcement cooperate with ICE. The
only conclusion that the study supports is ICE deports more unlawful aliens
for civil violations than criminal activity. Its authors believe this should
not be the case because it is inconsistent with congressional intent in insti-
tuting the CAP. However, the federal immigration scheme as a whole al-
107 Compare id. at 5 (Figure 1), with id. at 6 (Figure 3).
108 See id. at 5.
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lows for the deportation of any unlawful immigrant, not just criminal im-
migrants. In fact, it is more reasonable to argue that if ICE did not act it
would violate the executive branch's duty to enforce the law as prescribed
by Congress.109
Naturally, this does not dispel that state immigration verification laws
may lead to ancillary burdens not contemplated by Congress such as the re-
peated interception and detention of lawfully present aliens or unconstitu-
tional racial profiling.a10 If either of these scenarios should present them-
selves the respective state immigration verification law is preempted.
However, the evidentiary foundation necessary to prove such unconstitu-
tional ancillary burdens must be clear and convincing, not a plausible con-
clusion based upon the manipulation of evidence. 1 "l As was seen in the
case of the Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity & Diversity re-
port, it is rather easy for analysts to manipulate data to support a desired
conclusion. It is for this reason that the data points must be intimately re-
lated and connected as to prove the verification of immigration status re-
sults in unconstitutional violations across the board. 112
There will indeed be instances where individual persons are improperly
detained or racially profiled. There will also be instances where a respec-
tive city, town, or county improperly enforces the law as to impose uncon-
109 Certainly, as the federal immigration scheme is currently constituted, it is within the President
and ICE's discretion to set enforcement priorities. It is at ICE'S discretion to set enforcement priorities.
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. See also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) ("Once
Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the
Executive to administer the laws and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought.").. It
is also within the purview of the executive branch to not enforce unconstitutional laws. See Saikrishna
Bangalore Prakash, The Executive's Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1616
(2008). However, it is another thing to not enforce constitutional laws as enacted by Congress.
110 Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, supra note , at 730 (state immigration verification
laws "appear set to survive in the short-term, although under the new framework of immigration feder-
alism the long-term viability of such laws is questionable, at best."); Kerry Abrams, Essay: Plenary
Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 217, 630 (2013) ("the 'papers please' provision might be constitu-
tional if it is interpreted as (1) simply asking for papers and (2) checking identity quickly without any
unnecessary detention.").
111 For a discussion on the difference between "disparate impact" and "disparate treatment" in
analyzing racial profiling, see Nicola Persico and David A. Castleman, Detecting Bias: Using Statistical
Evidence to Establish Intentional Discrimination in Racial Profiling Cases, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217
(2005). For a discussion on the ambiguity of racial profiling evidence as applied to drug crimes, see R.
Richard Banks, Beyond Racial Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571
(2003).
112 See Melissa Whitney, The Statistical Evidence of Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops and Search-
es: Rethinking the Use of Statistics to Prove Discriminatory Intent, 49 B.C. L. REV. 263 (2008) (arguing
that there needs to be a strong statistical association between stops/searches and racial profiling). For a
counter argument, see David A. Harris, When Success Breeds Attack: The Coming Backlash Against
Racial Profiling Studies, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 237, 243 (2001) ("if African Americans or Latinos say
that they have been the victims of racial profiling, we should not ask for conclusive proof in the strictest
statistical sense; rather, if they can present some credible evidence beyond anecdotes, some statistics
that indicate that we may, indeed, have a problem, the burden should then shift to the public institu-
tion").
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stitutional ancillary burdens. In such cases, however, it is not the law that
is unconstitutional, but the enforcement. And in such cases, the legal re-
dress is civil rights litigation against the respective offenders, not the
preemption of the law itself. To be clear, there is a strong legal distinction
between a law that imposes unconstitutional ancillary burdens and individ-
uals that choose to impose unconstitutional ancillary burdens, such as racial
profiling, based upon a poor reading and application of the law.
III. CONCLUSION-THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE IMMIGRATION
VERIFICATION LAWS MOVING FORWARD
While the Supreme Court majority did not foreclose the future preemp-
tion of state immigration verification laws like Arizona's S.B. 1070 Section
2(B), it is unlikely that it or any similar state immigration verification laws
will be. Preemption requires either a showing of federally independent ver-
ification by the respective state or clear and convincing evidence that the
laws impose unconstitutional ancillary burdens on lawfully present aliens.
To date, neither of these scenarios presents itself, at least not yet. In fact,
despite a facial challenge being brought forth to every state immigration
verification law, in every case, the presiding federal court has upheld the
law as constitutionally permissible.11 3 But like the Supreme Court in Ari-
zona v. United States, these federal courts did not foreclose the possibility
of preemption on equal protection or racial profiling grounds.1 14 Still, it
will be rather difficult for opponents to prove state immigration verifica-
tions laws encourage or endorse unconstitutional racial profiling."l 5 A
close examination of the laws reveals that the practice is expressly de-
nounced, and not encouraged. Of course, this author is not nayve to believe
racial profiling will not rear its ugly head. The potential for racial profiling
presents itself in the enforcement of any law, not just state immigration ver-
ification laws.
And as the laws continue to be challenged by opponents, the lower
113 Utah Coalition of La Raza v. Herbert, Case No. 2: 1ll-cv-401 CW, at 8-9 (D.C. Utah 2014);
Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250, 1267-68 (11 th Cir. 2012); Unit-
ed States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1283-84 (1 1th Cir. 2012); United States v. South Carolina, 906 F.
Supp. 2d 463, 470-71 (D.C. S.C. 2012).
114 See supra note 113.
115 This is not to say civil rights and immigration rights organizations will not try. See, e.g., Carli
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courts will come to find that Justice Samuel Alito's concurrence provides
most of the answers they seek. Alito could not foresee how removable al-
iens can be located and reported if state officials do not have the authority
to inquire.16 In other words, the ability for state officials to inquire was
not what "ultimately matters" in terms of preemption. What matters is
"whether to act once the person's status is known," and so long as the dis-
cretion to act is controlled and administered by the federal government, the
state laws must be upheld as constitutional.1 1 7
Alito is also correct to point out that "nothing on the face of the law sug-
gest that it will be enforced in a way that violations the Fourth Amendment
or any other provision of the Constitution." 118 Indeed, Alito did not fore-
close there would be "occasions on which sensitive Fourth Amendment is-
sues will crop up," but if state immigration verification laws are "properly
implemented" they "should not lead to federal constitutional viola-
tions[.]"l19 The only question moving forward is whether the laws will be
adhered to by those required to enforce them.
116 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2526(Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 2527.
119 Id. at 2529.
